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Abstract
This article formally analyzes the various corrective mechanisms that have been
proposed and implemented to alleviate underinvestment in electric power genera-
tion. It yields three main analytical findings. First, physical capacity certificates
markets implemented in the United States restore optimal investment if and only
if they are supplemented with a “no short sale” condition, i.e., producers can not
sell more certificates than they have installed capacity. Then, they raise producers’
profits beyond the imperfect competition level. Second, financial reliability options,
proposed in many markets, are effective at curbing market power, although they
fail to fully restore investment incentives. If “no short sale” conditions are added,
both physical capacity certificates and financial reliability options are equivalent.
Finally, a single market for energy and operating reserves subject to a price cap is
isomorphic to a simple energy market. Standard peak-load pricing analysis applies:
under-investment occurs, unless production is perfectly competitive and the cap is
never binding.
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JEL Classification: L13, L94
1 Introduction
An essential objective of the restructuring of the electric power industry in the 1990s
was to “push to the market” decisions and risks associated with investment in power
generation, i.e., to have market forces, not bureaucrats, determine how much investment
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is required, and to have investors, not rate-payers, bear the risks of excess capacity,
construction cost overruns and delays.
However, since the early 2000s, generation adequacy has become an issue of concern
for policy makers, power System Operators (SOs), and economists. It would appear that,
contrary to the initial belief, the market does not necessarily provide for the adequate
level of generation capacity. Britain, that pioneered the restructuring of the electricity
industry in 1990, constitutes the most recent and striking example: Ofgem, the energy
regulator recently warned that, in its high demand scenario, involuntary curtailment of
customers will be imposed for 8 hours on average during the winter 2015/2016 (Ofgem,
2013).
Operating and regulatory practices aimed at preventing the exercise of market power
are often considered to be the primary cause of this market failure. As shown in Marcel
Boiteux (1949)’s seminal analysis, high prices a few hours per year are required to
finance the optimal capacity. However, in most jurisdictions SOs impose de jure or de
facto price caps, that deprive producers of these high prices. This revenue loss, called
“missing money”, is considered an important driver of underinvestment in generation
(Joskow, 2007).
Therefore, SOs and policy makers worldwide have designed and implemented a va-
riety of mechanisms to correct this apparent market failure (Finon and Pignon, 2008).
For example, most US power markets have adopted highly structured and prescriptive
physical certificates markets, and many European countries are considering, designing
or implementing capacity mechanisms1.
These mechanisms are extremely complex, hence expensive to set up and run. Fur-
thermore, they constitute a partial reversion towards central planning, which restructur-
ing precisely attempted to eliminate: using a centralized system reliability model, the
SO sets a generation capacity target, and organizes its procurement. Risk of overcapac-
ity is borne by consumers, while risk of cost overrun is borne by investors. A rigorous
economic analysis of the performance of the various market designs implemented by SOs
to restore investment incentives is therefore required. This is the objective of this article.
I am not aware of any previous systematic analytical comparison of these designs.
This work draws on a rich literature, that can be structured along two themes. A
first group of articles examines generation investment in restructured power markets.
While these works differ in important aspects, most model two stage games: in stage
1France formally instituted a capacity obligation mechanism in March 2012, to be effective in 2015.
Britain, Germany, and Belgium are designing mechanisms to ensure adequate capacity.
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1, producers decide on installed capacity; in stage 2 they produce and sell in the spot
markets, subject to the installed capacity constraint. For example, Borenstein and
Holland (2005) and Joskow and Tirole (2007), building on Boiteux (1949) and Crew and
Kleindorfer (1976), have developed the benchmark model of optimal investment and
production when (i) demand is uncertain at the time the investment decision is made,
and (ii) a fraction of the demand does not react to price. The former article considers
the perfect competition case, while the latter introduces some elements of imperfect
competition. Murphy and Smeers (2005) have developed models of closed- and open-
loop Cournot competition at the investment and spot market stages, and characterized
the equilibria of these games. Boom (2009) and Boom and Buehler (2014) have examined
the impact of vertical integration on equilibrium investment, while Fabra et al. (2011)
have examined the impact of the structure of the auction in the spot market on the
equilibrium investment. A more recent literature (e.g., Garcia and Shen, 2010) examine
multiperiod investment decisions. This article builds on the two-stage Cournot game
formalized in Zo¨ttl (2011).
A second group of works describes and analyzes the possible corrective mechanisms2.
Stoft (2002) discusses average Value of Lost Load (V oLL) pricing, Hogan (2005) proposes
an energy cum operating reserves markets, and Cramton and Stoft (2006 and 2008)
and Cramton and Ockenfels (2011) propose a financial reliability options mechanism3.
Joskow and Tirole (2007) show that a capacity market and a price cap do not restore
the first best with more than two states of the world. Chao and Wilson (2005) examine
the impact of options on spot market equilibrium, investment, and welfare. Zo¨ttl (2011)
determines the welfare maximizing price cap in the spot market. However, none of these
works presents a rigorous comparison of these mechanisms in a general and common
setting.
This article bridges these two strands of literature, that analyzes the proposals de-
scribed in the second group of articles using a rigorous economic model developed in the
first group: an extension of the two-stage Cournot model developed by Zo¨ttl (2011) to
include both “price reactive” customers and “constant price customers”, the latter being
unable to react to spot energy prices and being rationed in some instances (Borenstein
and Holland, 2005, Joskow and Tirole, 2007, Stoft, 2002, and Hogan, 2005). Its contri-
bution is to propose clear policy recommendations, building on the economic analysis
of these mechanisms. While this work’s primary focus is the electric power industry,
2Since these mechanisms are described extensively in the article, they are not developped further
here.
3Strictly speaking, these options ensure “resource adequacy”, not “reliability”. Nevertheless, I use
the word “reliability options” as it was the term used in the original Cramton and Stoft articles.
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the analysis presented here can serve as a basis to examine (under)investment issues
in other industries where participants must select capacity in the presence of signifi-
cant demand variability and uncertainty and limited storage possibilities, for example
telecommunications and transport networks.
This article yields three main analytical findings. First, it examines the equilibrium of
markets where energy and forward physical installed capacity certificates are separately
exchanged. This is the case for example in the Northeast of the United States: 3 to
5 years ahead, the SO procures from producers physical capacity certificates (usually
15 to 20% higher than anticipated peak load to protect against supply and demand
fluctuations). The cost of these purchases is then passed on to customers. Proposition 1
shows that the SO must impose a “no short sale” requirement, i.e., require producers to
sell less certificates than have installed capacity (or to build as much capacity as they have
sold certificates). If she does, a physical capacity certificates market restores investment
incentives: the resulting capacity installed is optimal. For a given price cap, social
welfare is thus maximized. However, producers profits are higher than the imperfect
competition outcome without the capacity market. Numerical illustration suggests the
additional rent from the capacity market is not negligible, that ranges ranges between
10 to 16% of the investment cost.
Second, this article analyzes the equilibrium of another form of forward markets,
where producers are required to sell, through the SO, financial call options to customers,
covering all the demand up to a certain level at a given strike price. Option sellers pay
customers the difference between the actual spot energy price and the strike price (Oren,
2005, Cramton and Stoft, 2006 and 2008, Cramton and Ockenfels, 2011).
Proposition 2 proves that options sale reduces but does not eliminate market power.
Installed capacity is higher with options sale than without, but still lower than socially
optimal. To ensure optimal investment, the SO must again impose a “no short sale” re-
quirement. If she does, Proposition 3 shows that financial reliability options and physical
capacity certificates with the “no short sale” conditions are equivalent if the “technical”
parameters are identical (e.g., if the option strike price equals the wholesale price cap).
Reliability options thus also sur-remunerate strategic underinvestment. While Proposi-
tions 2 and 3 are consistent with Chao and Wilson (2005) and Allaz and Villa (1993)’s
theoretical analysis of the interaction between forward and spot markets, they are new
to the literature.
Finally, this articles examines the “energy cum operating reserves market” proposed
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by Hogan (2005). SOs procure operating reserves to protect against an unplanned
generation outage. Hogan (2005) proposes the SO balances supply against demand for
energy and operating reserves, using the average V oLL as a price cap. Producers should
receive additional revenues since: (i) the resulting power price is higher than when
the SO balances supply against demand for energy alone, and (ii) capacity providing
operating reserves – but no energy – is remunerated. This additional revenue is expected
to resolve the missing money problem, hence restores investment incentives. However,
Proposition 5 shows this intuition is invalid: since these additional revenues are already
accounted for in the determination of the installed capacity, the situation is isomorphic
to standard peak-load pricing.
Each of these three mechanisms is examined individually in this article, while they
may be implemented jointly in practice. For example, most US markets have a physical
certificate mechanism and co-procurement of energy and operating reserves.
The analysis yields clear policy recommendations. If policy makers and the SO are
confident a market is sufficiently competitive, as may be the case in Texas, there is no
need to impose a price cap and set up a forward capacity market (physical or financial),
which are complex and costly to administer. Average V oLL pricing or an energy cum
operating reserves market are simple to set up and, if the V oLL used is close enough
to the real V oLL, cause limited distortion compared to the optimum. Furthermore, an
energy cum operating reserves market remunerates flexibility, an important issue which
is not covered in this work.
On the other-hand, policy makers may determine that generation is insufficiently
competitive in their jurisdiction. This may be the case in European markets, where
in most markets less than 10 generation companies actually compete. This may also
be the case where congestion on the transmission grid separates the market in smaller
submarkets, and producers may be able to exert local market power. Then, policy makers
should set up a forward capacity market as an interim measure while removing barriers
to competition. If they believe they can effectively enforce no short sale conditions,
they can choose between physical capacity certificates and financial reliability options.
If they believe that no short sale conditions are too costly to enforce, they should be
prefer financial reliability options.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model structure and ex-
amines the causes of underinvestment. Section 3 examines markets for physical installed
capacity certificates. Section 4 analyzes financial reliability options. Section 5 analyzes
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the “energy cum operating reserves market”. Finally, Section 6 suggests future research
directions. Technical proofs are included in the online Appendix.
2 Underinvestment
The model used throughout this article is developed in Le´autier (2014), building on
the analysis presented by Zo¨ttl (2011). This Section presents its main features and
conclusions. The interested reader is referred to Le´autier (2014) for a comprehensive
presentation of the model.
2.1 Model structure
Uncertainty Uncertainty is an essential feature of power markets. In this work, de-
mand uncertainty is explicitly modeled, while production uncertainty is taken into ac-
count implicitly through operating reserves (presented in Section 5). This representation
is suitable for markets that rely mostly on controllable generation technologies, such as
thermal and nuclear (see for example Chao and Wilson, 1987). Extension to markets
where intermittent sources constitute an important portion of the generation portfolio
is discussed in the concluding section.
The number of possible states of the world is infinite, and these are indexed by
t ∈ [0,+∞). The functions f (t) and F (t) are respectively the ex ante probability and
cumulative density functions of state t. Since all market participants have the same
information about future demand projections and construction plans, f (t) and F (t) are
common to all stakeholders.
Supply This article considers a single generation technology, characterized by marginal
cost c > 0 and investment cost4 r. A single technology is sufficient to analyze total
installed capacity, that depends solely on the characteristics of the marginal technology
(see for example Boiteux (1949) for the perfect competition case and Zo¨ttl (2011) for
the imperfect competition case).
Underlying demand
Assumption 1. All customers have the same underlying demand D (p, t) in state t,
where p the electric power price, up to a scaling factor.
4Both are expressed in €/MWh. r is the annual capital cost expressed in €/MWh/year divided by
8, 760 hours. It includes the cost of risk.
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Assumption 1 greatly simplifies the derivations, while preserving the main economics
insights. Inverse demand is P (q, t) defined by D (P (q, t) , t) = q, and gross consumers
surplus is S (p, t) =
´ D(p,t)
0 P (q, t) dq. P (q, t) is downward sloping: Pq (q, t) < 0. States
of the world are ordered by increasing demand: Pt (q, t) > 0.
Constant price customers, curtailment, and Value of Lost Load Only a frac-
tion α > 0 of customers face and react to real time wholesale price (“price reactive”
customers), while the remaining fraction (1− α) of customers face constant price pR in
all states of the world (“constant price” customers).
Since a fraction of customers does not react to real time price, there may be in-
stances when the SO has no alternative but to curtail demand, i.e., to interrupt supply.
As discussed for example in Joskow and Tirole (2007), there exists multiple rationing
technologies. Curtailment is represented by a serving ratio γ ∈ [0, 1]: γ = 0 represents
no serving (i.e., all energy to all consumers is curtailed), while γ = 1 represents full
serving (i.e., no customer is curtailed). D (p, γ, t) is the demand for price p and serving
ratio γ in state t, P (q, γ, t) is the inverse demand for a given serving ratio γ,defined by
D (P (q, γ, t) , γ, t) = q, and S (p, γ, t) is the gross consumer surplus.
Assumption 2. The SO has the technical ability to curtail “constant price” consumers
while not curtailing “price reactive” customers.
Assumption 2 holds only partially today: most SOs can only organize curtailment
by geographical zones, and cannot differentiate by type of customer. However, most
price reactive customers are large enough that they are connected directly to individual
transformers or to the high voltage grid, hence they need not be curtailed when the SO
curtail constant price customers. Assumption 2 will hold fully in a few years, when smart
grids are rolled out, as is mandated in most European countries and many US states.
It is expected that SOs will then be able to differentiate among adjacent customers
on the basis of the information provided by power suppliers, and curtail constant price
customers individually.
Since customers are homogeneous, the SO has no basis for discriminating among
them. Rationing is thus proportional, i.e., the fraction (1− γ) of constant price cus-
tomers is completely cut-off for the duration of the outage.
When consumers are curtailed, the marginal Value of Lost Load (V oLL) represents
the value they place on an extra unit of electricity (Joskow and Tirole, 2007, Stoft, 2002),
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formally defined as
v (p, γ, t) =
∂S
∂γ
∂D
∂γ
(p, γ, t) .
If the SO knew the V oLL for every rationing technology and state of the world (and
each customer class), the second best (as defined in the next Section) would be achieved5.
In reality, regulators, SOs and economists have little idea of the V oLL. Estimation is
extremely difficult, because the V oLL varies drastically across customer classes, states
of the world, and duration and conditions of outages. Estimates vary in an extremely
wide range from 2 000 £/MWh in the British Pool in the 1990s to 200 000 $/MWh
(see for example Cramton and Lien, 2000, and Praktiknjo and Erdmann, 2012). In
practice, the SO uses her best estimate of the average V oLL, i.e., the average value per
MWh of electricity lost for an average customer who loses all his service, and prioritizes
curtailment by geographic zones (economic activity, political weight, network conditions,
etc.), thus implementing a third best.
Both approaches produce downward sloping demand curves, hence are analytically
equivalent. In this work, I assume the SO knows exactly the V oLL. While this assump-
tion is unrealistic, it constitutes a useful analytical benchmark.
2.2 Socially optimal consumption and investment
Optimal consumption The residual inverse demand curve with possible curtailment
of constant price customers is
ρ (Q, t) = P
(
Q− (1− α)D (pR, γ∗, t)
α
, t
)
, (1)
where γ∗ is the optimal serving ratio in state t for production Q.
Price reactive customers face the wholesale spot price ρ (Q, t), hence are never cur-
tailed at the optimum. Off-peak, demand is low, and production Q (t) is determined by
ρ (Q (t) , t) = c. On-peak, demand is set by installed capacity K, and the wholesale price
is ρ (K, t).
As long as ρ (K, t) ≤ v (pR, 1, t), constant price customers are not curtailed in state
t. If ρ (K, t) > v
(
pR, 1, t
)
, then γ∗ < 1 is set to equalize constant price customers’ V oLL
5The VoLL would be different if instead all price responsive customers received only (1− γ) of their
demand. However, this does not change the analytical treatment presented in this article. I am grateful
to a referee for this observation.
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and the wholesale price
v
(
pR, γ∗, t
)
= ρ (K, t) .
Define t¯ (K) the first state of the world when curtailment may occur6. If curtailment
never occurs, t¯ (K)→ +∞. With a slight abuse of notation, define ρq = 1αPq
(
Q−(1−α)D(pR,t)
α , t
)
if no rationing occurs, and ρq =
∂v
∂K =
∂v
∂γ
∂γ∗
∂K if rationing occurs. Le´autier (2014) derives
sufficient conditions for ρ (Q, t) to be well-behaved, even when curtailment occurs.
As an illustration, suppose (i) inverse demand is linear with constant slope: P (q, t) =
a (t)−bq, and (ii) rationing perfectly anticipated and proportional: S (p, γ, t) = γS (p, t)
and D (p, γ, t) = γD (p, t). If no rationing occurs,
ρ (Q, t) =
a (t)− bQ− (1− α) pR
α
.
Since rationing is anticipated and proportional,
v
(
pR, γ, t
)
=
S
(
pR, t
)
D (pR, t)
= a (t)− bD
(
pR, t
)
2
=
a (t) + pR
2
.
Optimal investment The marginal social value capacity is
Ψ (K, c) =
ˆ +∞
tˆ0(K,c)
(ρ (K, t)− c) f (t) dt,
where tˆ0 (K, c) is the first state of the world such that price (weakly) exceeds the marginal
cost for production K
ρ
(
K, tˆ0 (K, c)
) ≥ c.
Ψ (K, c) is decreasing in both arguments. If ρ (0, 0) > c+ r, the optimal capacity K∗ is
the unique solution to
Ψ (K∗, c) = r.
Off-peak, as long as capacity is not constrained, price equals marginal cost, hence
marginal capacity generates no economic profit. On-peak, when capacity is constrained,
price exceeds marginal cost. The optimal capacity is set such that the marginal social
value capacity is exactly equal to the marginal capacity cost r.
If α is small, rationing of constant price customers may occur at the optimal capacity,
an issue known as the Theoretical (capacity) Adequacy Problem (TAP ). With the
6t¯ is a function of all the parameters. The notation t¯ (K) is used since the dependency on installed
capacity K is the most important in this analysis.
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specification summarized in Appendix A, Le´autier (2014) finds that rationing occurs at
the optimal capacity until α = 3.9% if the price elasticity of demand η = −0.01, and
α = 13.9% if η = −0.1. This result may seem counter-intuitive: a less elastic demand
results in less curtailment! The intuition is that, for a given α, capacity is higher when
demand is more inelastic, hence, curtailment is less frequent.
If the presence of constant price customers was the only imperfection in power mar-
kets, an energy only market design, sometimes referred to as average V oLL pricing,
would be efficient (Stoft, 2002, Oren, 2005): when constant price customers are cur-
tailed, the SO pays energy at the V oLL. This yields optimal investment, conditional
on the V oLL. If the SO knew exactly the V oLL, this would achieve a second best.
Otherwise, this would yield a third best.
However, power markets are subject to other imperfections. First, competition
among producers is less than perfect. Second, producers may be risk averse, which re-
duces their investment. Finally, investment decisions are dynamic and long-lived, more
complex than a simple static model suggests. This article focusses on the first imperfec-
tion, that examines the performance of corrective mechanisms in a static model where
agents are risk neutral. Extensions to a dynamic model and risk-averse agents are left
for further work.
2.3 Imperfect competition, price cap, and underinvestment
Consider now N producers, that play a two-stage game: in stage 1, producer n installs
capacity kn; in stage 2 he produces qn (t) ≤ kn in the spot market in state t. Producers
are assumed to compete a` la Cournot in the spot markets, facing inverse demand ρ (Q, t)
defined by equation (1). Stage 2 can be interpreted as a repetition of multiple states of
the world over a given period (for example one year), drawn from the distribution F (.).
Producers are assumed to be independent, i.e., not to be vertically integrated into
supply. A rich literature has examined how vertical integration modifies market behavior,
in particular investment incentives (Boom, 2009, and Boom and Buehler, 2014).
The game is solved by backwards induction: producers first compute profits from a
Nash equilibrium in the energy spot market for each state of the world t, given installed
capacities
(
k1, ..., kN
)
; then they make their investment choice in stage 1 based on the
expectation of these spot market profits.
Aggregate production in state t and aggregate installed capacity are respectively
Q (t) =
N∑
n=1
qn (t) and K =
N∑
n=1
kn. Producer’s n profit for the two-stage game is
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Πn (kn,k−n).
The results presented in this article hold for other forms of imperfect competition in
the spot market, as long they yield an equilibrium price higher than the marginal cost
c, and a profit function Πn (kn,k−n) with the required concavity. Cournot competition
is used as it provides simple analytical expressions that can be illustrated numerically.
To limit the exercise of market power, the SO imposes a cap p¯W on the wholesale
power price7, assumed to satisfy
c+ r ≤ p¯W ≤ ρ (0, 0) .
A price cap lower than the full marginal cost of the first unit of energy would block any
investment. A cap higher than the value of the first unit of energy consumed would have
limited effectiveness.
The first on-peak state of the world under imperfect competition, i.e., where the
marginal revenue for production K equals marginal cost is tˆ (K, c,N), uniquely defined
by
ρ
(
K, tˆ (K, c,N)
)
+
K
N
ρq
(
K, tˆ (K, c,N)
)
= c.
The aggregate capacity constraint may be binding before or after the price cap con-
straint in the relevant range, i.e., tˆ (K, c,N) ≤ tˆ0
(
K, p¯W
)
or tˆ (K, c,N) > tˆ0
(
K, p¯W
)
.
Introducing constant price customers makes tˆ (K, c,N) > tˆ0
(
K, p¯W
)
is a distinct possi-
bility, in particular if the residual demand ρ (Q, t) is very inelastic, i.e., if α or |η| are
very low.
Le´autier (2014) proves that, if certain technical sufficient conditions are met, the
equilibrium capacity KC
(
p¯W
)
is characterized by
Ω
(
KC , p¯W
)
= r,
7In practice, most SOs in the United States impose a cap on bids into the wholesale markets, not a
cap on wholesale price. A wholesale price cap simplifies the analysis, while preserving the main economic
insights.
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where Ω
(
K, p¯W
)
is defined by
Ω
(
K, p¯W
)
=
(ˆ tˆ0(K,p¯W )
tˆ(K,c,N)
(
ρ (K, t) +
K
N
ρq (K, t)− c
)
f (t) dt
)
I{tˆ(K,c,N)≤tˆ0(K,p¯W )}
+
ˆ +∞
tˆ0(K,p¯W )
(
p¯W − c) f (t) dt
where I{x≥0} is the indicator function, that takes the value 1 if x ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise.
This result illustrates the two distortions that reduce investment. First, if genera-
tion produces at capacity before the cap is reached, imperfect competition reduces the
marginal value of capacity by two terms: the reduction in profit on the inframarginal
units as in all Cournot competition models
(
K
N
´ tˆ0(K,p¯W )
tˆ(K,c,N)
ρq (K, t) f (t) dt
)
, but also the
lost margin (ρ (K, t)− c) in the states of the world t ∈ [tˆ0 (K, c) , tˆ (K, c,N)]. Both
effects are negative. Second, whether the cap or the generation capacity constraint
is reached first, the price cap reduces the marginal value, since the SO values energy
at ρ (K, t), while producers receive only p¯W < ρ (K, t). This is the “missing money”
discussed for example by Joskow (2007), and Cramton and Stoft (2006).
Le´autier (2014) then computes the resulting capacity, and proposes sufficient condi-
tions for the existence of price cap that maximizes welfare. The latter result extends
Zo¨ttl (2011) result to the presence of constant price customers (α ∈ (0, 1)). Taking
these constant price customers into account yields welfare maximizing price caps that
are much higher than those observed in most markets. Thus existing price caps will lead
to underinvestment, hence the need for corrective mechanisms.
3 Physical capacity certificates
The SO imposes price cap p¯W on the energy markets and procures at least K∗ physical
capacity certificates from producers. To simplify the notation and analysis, operating
reserves are ignored: as will be proven in Section 5, including them would not modify
the economic insights. All units (old and new) receive the same compensation in the
physical certificates markets.
The timing is as follows:
1. The SO designs the rules of the energy and capacity markets. All parameters are
set
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2. Producers sell physical capacity certificates to the SO, according to the rules set
up previously
3. Producers build new capacity if needed
4. The spot markets are played. In each state, producers compete a` la Cournot facing
ρ (Q, t), given their installed capacity and their physical capacity obligation. The
SO pays the physical certificates to the producers, and passes the cost of purchase
to customers.
To simplify the analysis, this pass-through is assumed not to distort consumption deci-
sions in the spot market, e.g., the pass-through is proportional to the size of the meter8.
Steps 2 and 3 can be inverted or simultaneous: generators first build the plants, then
sell physical capacity certificates, or build and sell simultaneously9.
φn and Φ =
N∑
m=1
φm are respectively the certificates sold by producer n and the
aggregate volume of certificates sold. In practice, SOs offer a “smoothed” (inverse)
demand curve:
H (Φ) =

r if Φ ≤ K∗
h (Φ) if K∗ < Φ < K∗ + ∆K¯
0 if Φ ≥ K∗ + ∆K¯
where (i) r, the capital cost of capacity, is the maximum price the SO is offering for
capacity, (ii) ∆K¯ > 0 is an arbitrary capacity increment, and (iii) h (.) is such that
H (.) is C2, except maybe at K∗ and K∗+ ∆K¯, h′ (Φ) < 0, 2h′ (Φ) +φh′′ (Φ) < 0 for all
φ, and ∣∣∣h′ (K∗)∣∣∣ ≥ Nr
K∗
. (2)
As will be discussed below, condition (2) simplifies the exposition, but is not essential.
It is met in practice. For example, Cramton and Ockenfels (2011) suggest a linear form
for h (.) with ∆K¯K∗ = 4%. Condition (2) is then equivalent to N
∆K¯
K∗ ≤ 1, and holds as
long as less than 25 producers compete.
Efficiency of the physical certificates market is conditional on the quality of the SO’s
estimate of the optimal capacity K∗. The three stage game (stages 2, 3, and 4) is
solved below, assuming the SOs knows perfectly K∗, uses r as the reserve price, and the
8One least distorting approach would be a levy proportional to peak consumption (in kW ). Since
these payments are assumed not to distort consumption decisions, they have no impact on social welfare.
This requires smart meters to measure peak consumption. I am grateful to a referee for this observation.
9The formal proof can be found in a previous version of this article, available at %
http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2012/visible.pdf.
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function H (.) is given. Determining the optimal stage−1 parameters is left for further
work. The equilibrium characterized as follows:
Proposition 1. The SO must impose and monitor that the installed capacity exceeds
the capacity certificates sold by each generator: kn ≥ φn. Then (i) producers issue as
many credits as they install capacity, and (ii) K∗is the unique symmetric equilibrium
investment level. Compared to the no installed capacity market situation, producer’s
profit and overall welfare are increased.
Proof. The full proof is presented in Appendix B. Existence of a physical capacity certifi-
cates market alone does not alter investment incentives. The SO must impose kn ≥ φn ,
otherwise KC remains the installed capacity.
If she does, producers sell exactly as many certificates as they have installed capacity
since incremental capacity is unprofitable unless it collects capacity markets revenues.
Then, since kn = φn at the equilibrium, producer n program is:
max
kn
ΠnCM (k
n ,k−n, ) = Πn (kn ,k−n) + knH (K)
Given the shape of the inverse demand function H (.), kn = K
∗
N for all n is the unique
symmetric equilibrium, and producers’ profit is:
ΠnCM
(
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
)
= Πn
(
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
)
+
K∗
N
r.
Then, since Πn (k, ..., k) is concave (Zo¨ttl, 2011) and KC ≤ K∗,
Πn
(
KC
N
, ...,
KC
N
)
≤ Πn
(
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
)
+
(
KC −K∗
N
)
∂Πn
∂k
(
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
)
⇔
∆ = ΠnCM
(
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
)
−Πn
(
KC
N
, ...,
KC
N
)
≥ −K
C
N
∂Πn
∂k
(
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
)
+
K∗
N
(
∂Πn
∂k
(
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
)
+ r
)
> 0
since ∂Π
n
∂k
(
K∗
N , ...,
K∗
N
)
< 0 and ∂Π
n
∂k
(
K∗
N , ...,
K∗
N
)
+ r = Ω (K∗) > 0.
Producers’ profits increase compare to the no installed capacity market situation.
Finally, since overall welfare W (K) increases up to to K = K∗, W (K∗) ≥W (KC).
Capacity markets do not automatically restore investment incentives. In the model,
producers exercise market power by reducing capacity ex ante, and not by withholding
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output on-peak. The SO must therefore ensure that producers cannot sell short, i.e.,
sell more certificates than their installed capacity.
This observation is not original to this work, for example it has been articulated by
Wolak (2006). Yet it remains an important practical challenge for SOs, that monitor that
existing generation assets providing certificates are still operational, and that planned
capacity having received certificates has indeed be installed. SOs then impose a penalty
on producers that, when requested, do not offer in the spot market energy up to the
certificates they have sold forward. The implementation challenge lies in assessing when
commitment has not been met, hence this process is still evolving. For example, ISO
New England recently proposed new rules for its forward market to ensure producers
have incentives to produce. The ban on short-selling is not universal: demand-side
resources can effectively sell-short in most US markets.
Physical capacity markets increase overall welfare, and also increase transfers from
customers to producers. This result is very general. Denote KE (not necessarily equal to
K∗) the equilibrium capacity including the certificates markets. As long as Πn (K, ...,K)
is concave, and KE > KC , the marginal value of capacity for the producers at KE is
negative: ∂Π
n
∂k
(
KE
N , ...,
KE
N
)
< 0. The equilibrium price in the capacity market (r in this
case) must compensate for this negative marginal value, otherwise KE would not be an
equilibrium: ∂Π
n
∂k
(
KE
N , ...,
KE
N
)
+ r ≥ 0. This is sufficient for the proof.
Although I had never seen its formal proof, this result is intuitive: producers must
receive a rent to induce them to invest beyond the oligopoly capacity. The illustrative
model developed by Le´autier (2014) provides an estimate of this additional rent ∆. It
varies slightly with the price cap p¯W and the proportion of price reactive customers
α. To simplify, I provide the average value of ∆ over all relevant values of p¯W and for
α = 5%, which appears appropriate for most markets. For price elasticity of demand
η = −0.01 the average rent is around 5, 100 €/MWh, approximately 10% of investment
cost; for η = −0.1 the average rent is around 8, 400 €/MWh, approximately 16% of
investment cost. These estimates illustrate that the rent created by the capacity market
is not trivial.
Is there an optimal structure to the physical certificates market? With the above
design, the only parameter that can be modified in the price cap p¯W . I choose as an
objective function the net surplus from consumption, therefore transfers from consumers
to producers do not impact social welfare. Then, since the resulting capacity is K∗ for all
p¯W , the latter has no impact on the resulting capacity. However, increasing p¯W always
increases welfare, as it reduces the probability of curtailment: when the cap is binding,
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no customer can respond to price, hence the SO must curtail. Thus, there exists no
optimal binding price cap with a capacity market as modeled here.
Finally, if condition (2) is not met, the aggregate capacity at the unique symmetric
equilibrium is KCCM ∈
(
K∗,K∗ + ∆K¯
]
. Welfare increases if and only if ∆K¯ is small
enough that W
(
K∗ + ∆K¯
) ≥W (KC).
4 Financial reliability options
Financial contracts constitute another mechanism used in power markets. This Section
examines financial reliability options, proposed by Oren (2005), Cramton and Stoft (2006
and 2008), and more recently Cramton and Ockenfels (2011). Options and not forward
contracts are the financial instruments analyzed here, since Chao and Wilson (2005), that
examine a slightly different option design, argue that options are in general preferable.
These options constitute an insurance against spot energy prices higher than a pre-agreed
strike price p¯S , sold by producers to customers. If the spot price p (t) is lower than p¯S ,
producer n does not make any payment. If p (t) > p¯S , producer n pays
(
p (t)− p¯S)
times a fraction of the realized demand equal to his fraction of the total options sale.
The SO does not impose a cap on wholesale prices, and runs an auction for financial
reliability options. θn and Θ =
N∑
m=1
θm are respectively the options sold by producer
n and the aggregate volume of options sold. To limit the potential exercise of market
power, Cramton and Ockenfels (2011) propose the SO impose all capacity must be
committed forward through option sales: θn ≥ kn.
The timing and notation are identical to the capacity market case, except that the
subscript RO is added when appropriate. A very simple auction setup is assumed, similar
to the one suggested by Cramton and Stoft (2008): the SO determines the volume she
desires to purchase, assumed to be K∗, sets the capital cost of capacity r as the reserve
price for the auction, and proposes a downward sloping inverse demand curve for options:
HRO (Θ) =

r if Θ ≤ K∗
hRO (Θ) if K
∗ < Θ < K∗ + ∆K¯RO
0 if Θ ≥ K∗ + ∆K¯RO
where (i) ∆K¯RO > 0 is an arbitrary capacity increment, and (ii) hRO (.) is such that
HRO (.) is C
2, except maybe at K∗ and K∗+∆K¯, h′RO (φ) < 0, 2h
′
RO (φ)+φh
′′
RO (Φ) < 0
for all φ, and hRO (.) verifies condition (2).
When the spot price exceeds the strike price, price-reactive consumers then pay p¯S as
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the effective price, i.e., they know when making their consumption decision they receive
rebate max
(
ρ (Q, t)− p¯S , 0) per unit of energy purchased. Then, actual demand does
not depend on the spot price, which leads to rationing.
tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
)
is the first state of the world such that the spot price exceeds the strike
price, and is defined by ρ
(
K, tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
)) ≥ p¯S . We assume p¯S satisfies
Ψ
(
KC
(
p¯S
)
, p¯S
) ≤ r. (3)
Condition (3) simplifies the exposition, as it guarantees that Θ = K∗ is the unique
equilibrium of the options market, however it is not essential. As shown in Appendix C,
Ψ
(
KC (p) , p
)
is decreasing in p, and and Ψ
(
KC (p) , p
) → 0 as p stops binding. Thus,
condition (3) is met for p¯S sufficiently high.
Chao and Wilson (2005) examine a slightly different market structure: they consider
physical options paired (or not) with a complementary price insurance, and compute the
linear supply function equilibrium for options forward sales and power spot sales. Their
findings are aligned with those presented below.
4.1 Expected profits with financial reliability options
The producers profit function is characterized below:
Lemma 1. The expected profit of producer n is
ΠnRO (k
n , θn ,k−n, θ−n) = θnHRO (Θ) + Πn (kn ,k−n) +
(
kn − θ
n
Θ
K
)
Ψ
(
K, p¯S
)
, (4)
with the convention that p¯S acts as the price cap in Πn.
Proof. Producer n receives the revenues from options sale θnHRO (Θ), plus profits from
the energy market. Suppose first tˆ (K, c,N) ≤ tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
)
. First, the producer receives
profit Πn (kn ,k−n) previously computed, assuming p¯S as price cap. Second, since there
is no price cap, he receives the difference between the spot price ρ (K, t) and the cap p¯S
for every unit produced when the price exceeds p¯S . Since tˆ (K, c,N) ≤ tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
)
, he
produces his entire capacity kn, hence he receives kn
´ +∞
tˆ0(K,p¯S)
(
ρ (K, t)− p¯S) f (t) dt =
knΨ
(
K, p¯S
)
.
Finally, when the spot price exceeds the strike price p¯S , each generator must pay(
ρ (K, t)− p¯S) times his fraction θnΘ of the total demand. Since tˆ (K, c,N) ≤ tˆ0 (K, p¯S),
total demand is equal to total capacity K and the payment is proportional to θ
n
Θ K.
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Total expected payment from generator n is thus: θ
n
Θ K
´ +∞
tˆ0(K,p¯S)
(
ρ (K, t)− p¯S) f (t) dt =
θn
Θ Ψ
(
K, p¯S
)
. Summing these terms yields equation (4).
Appendix C proves that Equation (4) also obtains if tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
)
< tˆ (K, c,N).
The profit realized in states higher than tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
)
is pinRO (K, t) = k
n
((
1− θnΘ Kkn
)
ρ (K, t) + θ
n
Θ
K
kn p¯
S − c).
Producers face a weighted average of the spot price and the option price, hence are less
sensitive to an increase in spot price. Consistent with Allaz and Villa (1993) and Chao
and Wilson (2005), a producer holding forward contracts faces lower incentives to exert
market power in the spot market.
4.2 Equilibrium capacity with financial reliability options
Proposition 2. Suppose the SO imposes θn ≥ kn and chooses strike price p¯S such that
condition (3) holds. Reliability options reduce but do not eliminate the underinvestment
problem. KCRO, the unique symmetric equilibrium of the options and investment game,
verifies
KC
(
p¯S
) ≤ KCRO < K∗,
with equality occurring when N = 1.
Proof. Appendix C proves that, if producers invest first then sell options, there exists a
unique symmetric equilibrium of the two-stage game, that satisfies
θn =
K∗
N
,
and kn =
KCRO
N , where K
C
RO is uniquely defined by
Ω
(
KCRO, p¯
S
)
+
N − 1
N
Ψ
(
KCRO, p¯
S
)
= r. (5)
Then,
Ω
(
KCRO, p¯
S
)
= r − N − 1
N
Ψ
(
KCRO, p¯
S
) ≤ r.
Hence KCRO ≥ KC
(
p¯S
)
. Then,
∂ΠnRO
∂kn
(
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
)
= −
ˆ tˆ(K,c,N)
tˆ0(K,c)
(ρ (K∗, t)− c) f (t) dt+ K
∗
N
ˆ tˆ0(K,p¯S)
tˆ(K,c,N)
ρq (K
∗, t) f (t) dt
− 1
N
Ψ
(
K∗, p¯S
)
< 0.
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Then K∗ > KCRO since we prove in Appendix C that Π
n
RO
(
K
N , ...,
K
N
)
is concave10.
For N > 1, reliability options curb the exercise of market power: the resulting
installed capacity is higher than the Cournot capacity. Thus, they are more effective
than physical certificates alone, that have no impact on installed capacity without the
“no short sale” obligation.
However, reliability options are not sufficient to completely eliminate market power
and restore optimal investment incentives. This result may appear surprising, since
reliability options impose a penalty of
(
ρ (K, t)− p¯S) on each unit a producer is short
energy. However, a closer examination of the mechanism reveals that, at the symmetric
equilibrium, this penalty represents only N−1N
(
ρ (K, t)− p¯S), which is not sufficient to
fully compensate for the “missing money”
(
ρ (K, t)− p¯S).
Proposition 2 mirrors Allaz and Villa (1993) analysis of the interaction between spot
and forward markets: assuming Cournot competition in both, they show that introducing
forward markets reduces but does not eliminate market power, and has not impact on a
monopoly (N = 1).
Finally, observe that generators short-sell certificates in equilibrium: θn = K
∗
N ≥
KCRO
N .
4.3 Equivalence between physical certificates and financial reliability
options when “no short sale” conditions are added
If the SO cannot impose a no short sale condition, Proposition 2 above proves that
financial reliability options yield higher investment. Which one should the SO choose
if she can impose a no short sale condition? Proposition 3 below shows that both
mechanisms are equivalent, if the technical parameters are equivalent:
Proposition 3. Suppose (i) the SO imposes and monitors that the installed capacity
equals the options sold by each generator: kn = θn, (ii) the wholesale price cap in the
capacity market is set equal to the strike price of the reliability option
(
p¯S = p¯W
)
and
satisfies condition (3), and (iii) the demand functions for reliability options and for
capacity credits are identical and satisfy condition (2). Then, financial reliability options
yield the same equilibrium as a capacity market with a no short-sale condition.
Proof. Since the SO imposes θn = kn , equation (4) yields
ΠnRO (k
n ,k−n) = Πn (kn ,k−n) + knHRO (K) .
10A previous version of this work, available at http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2012/visible.pdf, shows that the
result also holds if producers sell certificates, then invest, or sell certificates and invest simultaneously.
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If p¯S = p¯W and HRO (.) = H (.), then, with the no short sale conditions, Π
n
RO = Π
n
CM .
Thus the equilibria are identical.
As mentioned earlier, since producers sell exactly as many options as their installed
capacity (or install as much capacity as they sold options), the profit net of the payment
on the option is equivalent to a cap on prices. Therefore, if the technical parameters are
identical, both approaches are equivalent.
5 Energy cum operating reserves market
SOs must secure operating reserves to protect the system against catastrophic failure.
Hogan (2005) suggests that remuneration of these operating reserves may help resolve
the missing money problem11.
The representation of operating reserves is that of Borenstein and Holland (2005).
For simplicity, only one type of reserves is considered, the non-spinning one (i.e., plants
that are not running, but can start up and produce energy within a short pre-agreed
time frame). Since the plant is not running, the marginal cost of providing reserves
is normalized to zero. In reality, SOs run multiple markets for operating reserves, for
example, spinning, 10-minutes, 30-minutes. The economic insights are not modified, as
long as the no-arbitrage condition presented below holds.
Hogan (2005) proposes that the SO runs a single market for energy and operating
reserves. Generating units called to produce receive the wholesale price w (t), generating
units that provide operating reserves receive the wholesale price w (t) less the marginal
cost of generation c, assumed to be perfectly known by the SO. Generators are there-
fore indifferent between producing energy or providing reserves, an essential condition
(Borenstein and Holland, 2005). When an unscheduled generation outage occurs, oper-
ating reserves produce energy and receive the full price w (t).
Operating reserves requirements are expressed as a percentage of demand, denoted
h (t), and taken as given here12. Defining the optimal h (t) requires advanced network
11Hogan (2005) conjectures: “Under stressed conditions there would not be adequate capacity to meet
all load and maintain the target nominal level of reserves. This would give rise to scarcity pricing
determined by the capacities of the generation offered, the energy demand, and the administrative
demand for operating reserves. (...) Payments for operating reserves would be made to generators
providing reserves and the cost would be applied to loads in a proportional uplift payment. All generators
providing energy would receive the high energy price. All generators providing reserves would receive
this high energy price less the variable cost of the marginal reserve capacity. Although scarcity conditions
with very high prices would apply in relatively few hours, the payments to generators during these hours
would include a large fraction of the total contribution to fixed and investment costs.”
12In practice, various metrics for operating reserves are used, including absolute values expressed in
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analysis, hence is beyond the scope of this work. Joskow and Tirole (2007) show the
optimal reserve ratio increases with the state of the world; hence h (t) is assumed to be
nondecreasing.
The retail price p (t) must be higher than wholesale price w (t) to cover generators’
revenues from the operating reserves market. A natural choice is to directly include the
cost of reserves in the retail price faced by price reactive customers13:
p (t) = w (t) + h (t) (w (t)− c)
⇔
p (t)− c = (1 + h (t)) (w (t)− c) (6)
Throughout this section, the retail and wholesale prices are assumed to be related by
equation (6). The notation and model structure are identical to the previous Sections,
except that the subscript or superscript OR is added when appropriate.
Only the fraction 11+h(t) of installed capacity is used to meet demand in state t,
hence K1+h(t) and not K is the output appearing in the function ρ (., t) (a formal proof is
presented in Appendix D). Thus, the marginal social value of capacity in state t is
w (K, t)− c = p (t)− c
1 + h (t)
=
ρ
(
K
1+h(t) , t
)
− c
1 + h (t)
.
The marginal social value of capacity is
ΨOR (K) =
ˆ +∞
tˆOR0 (K,c)
ρ
(
K
1+h(t) , t
)
− c
1 + h (t)
f (t) dt,
where tˆOR0 (K, c) is uniquely defined
14 by ρ
(
K
1+h(t) , tˆ
OR
0 (K, c)
)
= c.
The socially optimal capacity is thus uniquely defined by
ΨOR (K
∗
OR) = r. (7)
Consider now the producers’ problem. By construction, producers are indifferent
between producing energy or providing reserves. In state t, they offer sn (t) into the
MW . Expressing reserves as a percentage of peak demand simplifies the analysis while preserving the
main economic intuition.
13Borenstein and Holland (2005) show it to be the perfect competition outcome.
14Since h (t) is nondecreasing, m1 (K; t) = ρ
(
K
1+h(t)
; t
)
is increasing in t: ∂m1
∂t
= −ρq Kh
′(t)
(1+h(t))2
+ρt > 0.
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energy cum operating reserves market. S (t) =
∑N
n=1 s
n (t) is the total offer. Energy
available to meet demand is Q (t) = S(t)1+h(t) . The SO then (i) verifies that s
n (t) ≤ kn,
and (ii) allocates each sn (t) between energy qn (t) and reserves bn (t). Producer n profit
is then
pin (t) = (qn (t) + bn (t)) (w (t)− c)
=
sn (t)
1 + h (t)
(
ρ
(
S (t)
1 + h (t)
)
− c
)
,
since (i) energy and operating reserves receive same net revenue by construction, and
(ii) wholesale (w (t)) and retail
(
ρ
(
S(t)
1+h(t)
))
prices are linked by equation (6). The
problem is then isomorphic to standard peak load pricing, except that s
n(t)
1+h(t) replaces
production qn (t).
tˆOR (K, c,N), the first on-peak state of the world under imperfect competition, is
uniquely defined15 by ρ
(
K
1+h(tˆOR)
, tˆOR
)
+ 1N
K
1+h(tˆOR)
ρq
(
K
1+h(tˆOR)
, tˆOR
)
= c.
The SO imposes a wholesale price cap v equal to her best estimate of V oLL.
tˆOR0 (K, v), the first state of the world where the cap may be binding, is uniquely defined
by ρ
(
K
1+h(tˆOR0 )
, tˆOR0
)
= v. For simplicity, v is assumed to be binding after the capacity
constraint under imperfect competition: tˆOR (K, c,N) ≤ tˆOR0 (K, v). The inverse de-
mand function for producers is then: ρ
(
K
1+h(t) , t
)
as long as price cap is not reached,
and a horizontal inverse demand at v afterwards.
Following the steps of the standard peak load analysis, the marginal value of capacity
for a producer at the symmetric equilibrium is
ΩOR (K) =
ˆ tˆOR0 (K,v)
tˆOR(K,c,N)
(
ρ
(
K
1 + h (t)
, t
)
+
1
N
K
1 + h (t)
ρq
(
K
1 + h (t)
, t
)
− c
)
f (t) dt
+
ˆ +∞
tˆOR0 (K,v)
v − c
1 + h (t)
f (t) dt,
and there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium for which each generator invests
KCOR
N defined by:
ΩOR
(
KCOR
)
= r. (8)
15Similarly, m2 (t) = ρ
(
K
1+h(t)
; t
)
+ 1
N
K
1+h(t)
ρ
(
K
1+h(t)
; t
)
is increasing in t since m′2 (t) =
−
(
N+1
N
ρq +
1
N
K
1+h(t)
ρqq
)
Kh′(t)
(1+h(t))2
+ ρt > 0.
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Proposition. Suppose the SO runs an energy cum operating reserves market and im-
poses a price cap v. The problem is isomorphic to standard peak load pricing. KCOR <
K∗OR unless (i) generation is perfectly competitive (N → +∞), and (ii) the price cap is
never binding
(
tˆOR0 (K, v)→ +∞
)
.
Proof. The result follows immediately from equations (8) and (7).
Including an operating reserve market leads to the same investment incentives as
average V oLL pricing. This result is surprising: one would have expected the operating
reserves market to alleviate the missing money problem, since (i) all producing units
receive a higher price, and (ii) units providing capacity but not energy are remunerated.
However, the discussion above shows these two effects are already included in the de-
termination of the socially and privately optimal capacities K∗OR and K
C
OR. Then, units
providing reserve capacity receive the same profit (w (t)− c) as units producing electric-
ity, to avoid arbitrage between markets. No additional profit is generated. The operating
reserves market remunerates reserves, which are needed, not capacity investment.
6 Conclusion
This article formally analyzes the various corrective mechanisms that have been proposed
and implemented to alleviate underinvestment in electric power generation. It yields
three main analytical findings. First, physical capacity certificates markets implemented
in the United States restore optimal investment if and only if they are supplemented with
a no short sale condition, i.e., producers can not sell more certificates than they have
installed capacity. Then, they raise producers’ profits beyond the imperfect competition
level. Second, financial reliability options, proposed in many markets, are effective at
curbing market power, although they fail to fully restore investment incentives. If no
short sale conditions are added, both physical capacity certificates and financial relia-
bility options are equivalent. Finally, a single market for energy and operating reserves
subject to a price cap is isomorphic to a simple energy market. Standard peak-load pric-
ing analysis applies: under-investment occurs, unless production is perfectly competitive
and the cap is never binding.
This analysis highlight the limitations of the corrective mechanisms. This suggest
that policy makers should first and foremost control and reduce the exercise of market
power, then use these mechanisms as interim remedial measures. If they believe they can
effectively enforce no short sale conditions, they can choose between physical capacity
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certificates and financial reliability options. If they believe that no short sale conditions
are too costly to enforce, they should be prefer financial reliability options.
These results provide a sound basis for policy makers decision making. Different
avenues for further work would increase their applicability. First, expand the economic
models to other types of technologies: (i) intermittent and uncontrollable production
technologies such as photovoltaic and on- and off-shore wind mills, which will provide an
increasingly important share of power supply16; (ii) reservoir hydro production, which
has almost zero marginal cost, but limited overall production capacity, and (iii) volun-
tary curtailment, i.e., consumers reducing their consumption upon the SO’s request.
Second, determine the optimal design parameters. In this work, we have taken the
auction parameters (reserve price, shape of the demand function) as given. Optimally
selecting these parameters may lead to higher welfare17.
Third, examine how these designs performe under different vertical industry struc-
tures. Bushnell et al. (2008) have examined how vertical industry structure impacts
market performance, and Boom (2009) and Boom and Buehler (2014) have examined
how vertical industry structure impacts investment. It would be important to determine
which combination of market structure and capacity mechanism is most effective.
Finally, expand the model to multiple investment periods. Observation suggests the
power industry, like many capital-intensive industries, displays cycle of over- and under-
investment (“boom bust” cycles). Understanding how various market designs perform
in a dynamic setting is therefore extremely important.
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A Numerical illustration
Inverse demand is P (q, t) = a0−a1e−λ2t−bq, states of the world are distributed according
to f (t) = λ1e
−λ1t, and rationing is anticipated and proportional. a0, a1, λ = λ1λ2 , and
bQ∞ where Q∞ = a0−p0b is the maximum demand for price p0, are the parameters to
be estimated. λ is estimated by Maximum Likelihood using the load duration curve for
France in 2010. The same load duration curve provides an expression of a0 and a1 as a
function of bQ∞. The average demand elasticity η is then used to estimate bQ∞. Two
estimates of demand elasticity at price p0 = 100 €/MWh are tested: η = −0.01 and
η = −0.1, respectively the lower and upper bound proposed by Lijesen (2007). The
resulting estimates are
for η = −0.1
bQ∞ = 1 873 €/MWh
a0 = 1 973 €/MWh
a1 = 1 236 €/MWh
λ = 1.78
, and
for η = −0.01
bQ∞ = 18 727 €/MWh
a0 = 18 827 €/MWh
a1 = 12 360 €/MWh
λ = 1.78
.
Generation costs are those of a gas turbine, c = 72 €/MWh and r = 6 €/MWh as
provided by the International Energy Agency, IEA (2010). The regulated energy price
is pR = 50 €/MWh, from Eurostat18.
B Physical capacity certificates
B.1 No short sale condition
Suppose first the SO imposes no condition on certificates sales. Producer n’s ex-
pected profit, including revenues from the capacity market is: ΠnCM (k
n , φn ,k−n, φ−n) =
Πn (kn ,k−n) + φnH (Φ). Since φn does not enter Πn (kn ,k−n),
∂ΠnCM
∂kn
(
K
N
, ...,
K
N
)
=
∂Πn
∂kn
(
K
N
, ...,
K
N
)
:
the certificate market has no impact on equilibrium investment.
Suppose now the SO imposes kn ≥ φn . Consider the case where producers first
sell credits, then install capacity. When selecting capacity, each producer maximizes
18Table 2 Figure 2 from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics explained/images/a/a1/Energy%
prices 2011s2.xls
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Π¯nCM (kn,k−n) subject to kn ≥ φn . The first-order condition is then
∂Ln
∂kn
=
∂Π¯n
∂kn
+ µn1 ,
where µn1 is the shadow cost of the constraint k
n ≥ φn . Suppose first φˆn < kˆn ∀n, then
µn1 = 0 ∀n and kˆn = K
C
N at the symmetric equilibrium. When selecting the amount
of credits sold, the producers then maximize φnH (Φ). Given the shape of H (.), the
symmetric equilibrium is φˆn ≥ K∗N . But then, KC > Φ ≥ K∗, which is a contradiction,
hence φˆn = kˆn .
Since kn = φn at the equilibrium, producer n program is
max
kn
ΠnCM (k
n ,k−n, ) = Πn (kn ,k−n) + knH (K)
We prove below that
(
K∗
N , ...,
K∗
N
)
is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
B.2 Equilibrium investment if generation produces at capacity before
the cap is reached
Suppose tˆ (K, c,N) ≤ tˆ0
(
K, p¯W
)
. As observed by Zo¨ttl (2011), the profit function
Πn
(
k1, ..., kn , ..., kN
)
is not concave in kn , so one must separately consider a positive
and negative deviation from a symmetric equilibrium candidate to prove existence of
the equilibrium. Consider first a negative deviation, i.e., k1 < K
∗
N while k
n = K
∗
N for all
n > 1. Since K = k1 + N−1N K
∗ < K∗,
∂Π1CM
∂k1
(
k1 ,
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
)
=
∂Π1
∂k1
(
k1 ,
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
)
+ r.
Analysis of the two-stage Cournot game (Zo¨ttl (2011) for α = 1, Le´autier (2013) for
α ∈ (0, 1)) yields:
∂Π1
∂k1
(
k1 ,
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
)
=
ˆ tˆ(K,c,N)
t1
(
ρ
(
Qˆ (k1 , t)
)
+ k1ρq
(
Qˆ (k1 , t)
) ∂Qˆ
∂k1
− c
)
f (t) dt
+
ˆ tˆ0(K,p¯W )
tˆ(K,c,N)
(
ρ (K) + k1ρq (K)− c
)
f (t) dt (9)
+
ˆ +∞
tˆ0(K,p¯W )
(
p¯W − c) f (t) dt− r,
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where t1 is the first state of the world where producer 1 is constrained, Qˆ (k1 , t) =
k1 + (N − 1)φN (k1 , t) is the aggregate production, and φN (k1 , t) is the equilibrium
production from the remaining (N − 1) identical producers, that solves
ρ
(
k1 + (N − 1)φN (k1 , t))+ φN (k1 , t) ρq (k1 + (N − 1)φN (k1 , t)) = c.
φN (k1 , t) ≥ k1 for t ∈ [t1, tˆ (K, c,N)]: lower-capacity producer 1 is constrained,
while the (N − 1) higher capacity producers are not. Since quantities are strategic
substitutes, ∂φ
N
∂k1 < 0 and
0 <
∂Qˆ
∂k1
= 1 + (N − 1) ∂φ
N
∂k1
< 1.
ρ
(
Qˆ
)
+k1ρq
(
Qˆ
)
−c = (k1 − φN) ρq (Qˆ) ∂Qˆ∂k1 ≥ 0 for t ∈ [t1, tˆ (K, c,N)]. ρ (K, tˆ (K, c,N))+
k1ρq
(
K, tˆ (K, c,N)
)
= c, and ρt (K) + k
1ρqt (K) ≥ 0, hence ρ (K) + k1ρq (K)− c ≥ 0 for
t ≥ tˆ (K, c,N). Therefore
∂Π1
∂k1
(
k1 ,
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
)
+ r > 0
for k1 < K
∗
N : no negative deviation is profitable.
Consider now a positive deviation, i.e., kN > K
∗
N while k
n = K
∗
N for all n < N . Since
K = kN + N−1N K
∗ > K∗ :
∂ΠNCM
∂kN
(
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
, kN
)
=
∂ΠN
∂kN
(
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
, kN
)
+ kNH
′
(K) +H (K) ,
and
∂2ΠNCM
(∂kN )2
(
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
, kN
)
=
∂2ΠN
(∂kN )2
(
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
, kN
)
+ kNH
′′
(K) + 2H
′
(K) .
Zo¨ttl (2011) shows that, for kN > KN ,
∂2ΠN
∂ (kN )2
(
KC
N
, ...,
KC
N
, kN
)
=
ˆ tˆ0(K,p¯W )
tN
[
2ρq
(
Kˆ, t
)
+ kNρqq
(
Kˆ, t
)]
f (t) dt
+kNρq
(
Kˆ, tˆ0
(
K, p¯W
))
f
(
tˆ0
(
K, p¯W
)) ∂tˆ0 (K, p¯W )
∂kN
(10)
< 0.
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Thus,
∂ΠNCM
∂kN
(
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
, kN
)
<
∂ΠN
∂kN
(
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
)
+
K∗
N
H
′
(K∗) + r < 0
since condition (2) implies K
∗
N H
′
(K∗) + r < 0.
Hence,
(
K∗
N , ...,
K∗
N
)
is a symmetric equilibrium. Finally, no other symmetric equilib-
rium exists since Πn
(
K
N , ...,
K
N
)
+ KNH (K) is concave.
B.3 Equilibrium investment if the cap is reached before generation
produces at capacity
Suppose tˆ0
(
K, p¯W
)
< tˆ (K, c,N). To simplify the exposition, generators are ordered
by increasing capacity k1 ≤ ... ≤ kN , and suppose that the price cap is reached be-
fore the first generator produces at capacity. Le´autier (2014) proves that the expected
equilibrium profit is
Πn (kn,k−n) =
ˆ t˜0
0
Qˆ (t)
N
(
ρ
(
Qˆ
)
− c
)
f (t) dt+
(
p¯W − c)(n−1∑
i=0
ˆ t˜i+1
t˜i
q˜i+1 (t) f (t) dt+ kn
(
1− F (t˜n)))−rkn ,
(11)
where Qˆ (t) is the unconstrained Cournot output in state t, t˜0 is the first state of the
world such that the price cap is reached, defined by ρ
(
Qˆ
(
t˜0
)
, t˜0
)
= p¯W , t˜i+1 for
i = 0, ..., (N − 1) is the first state of the world such that producer (i+ 1) is constrained,
defined by ρ
(∑i
j=1 k
j + (N − j) ki+1, t
)
= p¯W , and q˜i+1 (t) is defined on
[
t˜i, t˜i+1
]
by
ρ
 i∑
j=1
kj + (N − j) q˜i+1 (t) , t
 = p¯W .
For t ≤ t˜0, unconstrained Cournot competition takes place. For t ≥ t˜0, the Cournot
price would exceed the cap, hence wholesale price is capped at p¯W . All generators play a
symmetric equilibrium characterized by ρ
(
Nq˜1 (t) , t
)
= p¯W . When t reaches t˜1 generator
1 produces its capacity. For t ≥ t˜1, the remaining (N − 1) generators play a symmetric
equilibrium characterized by ρ
(
k1 + (N − 1) q˜2 (t) , t) = p¯W . This process continues
until all generators produce at capacity. t˜N is such that ρ
(∑N
j=1 k
j , t˜N
)
= p¯W , hence
t˜N = tˆ0
(
K, p¯W
)
previously defined. For t > t˜N , since wholesale price is fixed at p¯W and
generation is at capacity, the SO must curtail constant price consumers.
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Differentiation of equation (11) yields
∂Πn
∂kn
(
k1 , ..., kN
)
=
ˆ +∞
t˜n
(
p¯W − c) f (t) dt− r, (12)
and
∂2Πn
(∂kn)2
(
k1 , ..., kN
)
= − (p¯W − c) f (t˜n) ∂t˜n
∂kn
< 0.
Πn
(
k1 , ..., kN
)
is concave in kn. The previous analysis then shows that
(
K∗
N , ...,
K∗
N
)
is
the unique symmetric equilibrium.
B.4 Producers extra profits from the capacity markets
Le´autier (2014) shows that, for common values of the parameters, tˆ0
(
K, p¯W
)
< tˆ (K, c,N).
This is the case considered to evaluate ∆. At a symmetric equilibrium, equation (11)
yields
Πn
(
K
N
, ...,
K
N
)
=
1
N
 ´ t˜00 Qˆ (t)(ρ(Qˆ (t) , t)− c) f (t) dt+ (p¯W − c) ´ tˆ0(K,p¯W )t˜0 Q˜ (t) f (t) dt
+K
((
p¯W − c) (1− F (tˆ0))− r)
 ,
∆ = Πn
(
K∗
N , ...,
K∗
N
)
+ rK
∗
N −Πn
(
KC
N , ...,
KC
N
)
is then estimated numerically.
C Financial reliability options
The equilibrium is solved by backwards induction. In the second stage, producers solve
the equilibrium of the option market, taking (kn,k−n) as given.
We assume that including the option market does not decrease investment, i.e.,
K ≥ KC (p¯S). As suggested by Cramton and Ockenfels, the SO imposes the restriction
that all capacity is sold forward: θn ≥ kn . This restriction is made operational by
conditioning profits from the option market to θn ≥ kn . Since these profits are positive,
θn ≥ kn is a dominant strategy, hence holds.
C.1 Derivation of the profit function if the strike price is reached be-
fore generation produces at capacity
If reliability options are in effect, the price cap is eliminated. For simplicity, assume that
the strike price is reached before the first generator produces at capacity, and denote
t˜0 this state of the world. For t ≥ t˜0, consumers consume as if the price was p¯S , since
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they internalize the impact of the reliability option. As long as total generation is not at
capacity, the wholesale price is indeed p¯S , and the equilibrium is identical to the previous
one. When total generation reaches capacity, since consumers consume using constant
price p¯S , the SO must curtail constant price consumers. The wholesale price reaches the
V oLL. Generators must then rebate the difference between the wholesale price and the
strike price, in proportion to the volume of options sold.
The resulting equilibrium profit is
ΠnRO (k
n,k−n) =
ˆ t˜0
0
Qˆ (t)
N
(
ρ
(
Qˆ
)
− c
)
f (t) dt
+
(
p¯S − c)(n−1∑
i=0
ˆ t˜i+1
t˜i
q˜i+1 (t) f (t) dt+ kn
ˆ tˆ0(K,p¯S)
t˜n
f (t) dt
)
+
ˆ +∞
tˆ0(K,p¯S)
(
kn (ρ (K, t)− c)− θ
n
Θ
K
(
ρ (K, t)− p¯S)) f (t) dt− rkn
= Πn (kn,k−n)
+
ˆ +∞
tˆ0(K,p¯S)
(
kn (ρ (K, t)− c)− θ
n
Θ
K
(
ρ (K, t)− p¯S)− kn (p¯S − c)) f (t) dt
= Πn (kn,k−n) +
(
kn − θ
n
Θ
K
) ˆ +∞
tˆ0(K,p¯S)
(
ρ (K, t)− p¯S) f (t) dt
= Πn (kn,k−n) +
(
kn − θ
n
Θ
K
)
Ψ
(
K, p¯S
)
.
C.2 Equilibrium in the options market
We first establish that dΨdp
(
KC (p) , p
)
< 0 and limp→p˘Ψ
(
KC (p) , p
)
= 0, where p˘ is the
maximum price cap reached in equilibrium. Differentiation with respect to p yields
dΨ
dp
(
KC (p) , p
)
=
ˆ +∞
tˆ0(KC(p),p)
(
ρq
dKC
dp
− 1
)
f (t) dt.
Suppose tˆ (K, c,N) > tˆ0
(
K, p¯W
)
. Then, KC (p) is defined by
ˆ +∞
tˆ0(KC(p),p)
(p− c) f (t) dt = (p− c) (1− F (tˆ0 (KC (p) , p))) = r.
Full differentiation with respect to p yields
(
1− F (tˆ0))− (p− c) f (tˆ0)(∂tˆ0
∂p
+
∂tˆ0
∂K
dKC
dp
)
= 0
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⇔
∂tˆ0
∂p
+
∂tˆ0
∂K
dKC
dp
=
1− F (tˆ0)
(p− c) f (tˆ0) .
Differentiation of ρ
(
K, tˆ0 (K, p)
)
= p yields ∂tˆ0∂K = −ρqρt and ∂tˆ0∂p = 1ρt . Thus,
1− ρq dK
C
dp
=
ρt
p− c
1− F (tˆ0)
f
(
tˆ0
) > 0,
therefore dΨdp (K
c (p) , p) < 0.
Suppose now tˆ (K, c,N) ≤ tˆ0
(
K, p¯W
)
. KC (p) is defined by
ˆ tˆ0(KC(p),p)
tN (KC(p))
(
ρ
(
KC (p) , t
)
+
KC (p)
N
ρq
(
KC (p) , t
)− c) f (t) dt+ˆ +∞
tˆ0(KC(p),p)
(p− c) f (t) dt = r.
Full differentiation with respect to p yields
I
dKC
dp
+
KC
N
ρq
(
∂tˆ0
∂p
+
∂tˆ0
∂K
dKC
dp
)
+
(
1− F (tˆ0)) = 0,
where I =
´ tˆ0
tN
(
N+1
N ρq +
KC
N ρqq
)
f (t) dt < 0. Substituting in ∂tˆ0∂K and
∂tˆ0
∂p yields:
−IρtdK
C
dp
− K
C
N
ρq
(
1− ρq dK
C
dp
)
= ρt
(
1− F (tˆ0))
⇔
1− ρq dK
C
dp
=
ρt
(
ρq
(
1− F (tˆ0))+ I)
Iρt − KCN ρ2q
> 0,
therefore dΨdp (K
c (p) , p) < 0.
Finally, KC (p) converges when p → p˘, thus (P (Kc (p) , t)− c) is bounded, thus
limp→p˘Ψ (Kc (p) , p) = 0 since limp→p˘tˆ0 (Kc (p) , p) = 0.
We now prove that θn = K
∗
N ≥ kn for all n is a symmetric equilibrium if condition
(3) holds. Differentiation of equation (4) yields:
∂ΠnRO
∂θn
(θn , θ−n) = HRO (Θ) + θnH
′
RO (Θ)−
Θ− θn
Θ2
KΨ
(
K, p¯S
)
,
and
∂2ΠnRO
(∂θn)2
(θn , θ−n) = 2H
′
RO (Θ) + θ
nH
′′
RO (Θ) + 2
Θ− θn
Θ3
KΨ
(
K, p¯S
)
.
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For Θ ≤ K∗,
∂2ΠnRO
(∂θn)2
(θn , θ−n) = 2
Θ− θn
Θ3
KΨ
(
K, p¯S
)
> 0.
∂ΠnRO
∂θn is increasing, thus the only equilibrium candidates are θ
n = K
∗
N and θ
n = kn.
Furthermore,
∂2ΠnRO
∂θn∂θm
(θn , θ−n) =
(
2
Θ− θn
Θ3
+
θn
Θ2
)
KΨ
(
K, p¯S
)
> 0,
thus
∂ΠnRO
∂θn
(θn , θ−n) ≥ ∂Π
n
RO
∂θn
(
k1 , ..., kN
)
.
Then,
∂ΠnRO
∂θn
(
k1 , ..., kN
)
= r−K − k
n
K2
KΨ
(
K, p¯S
)
> r−Ψ (K, p¯S) ≥ r−Ψ (KC (p¯S) , p¯S) > 0
since K ≥ KC (p¯S) by assumption. Thus, if condition (3) holds, ∂ΠnRO∂θn (θn , θ−n) > 0 for
all θn such that θn ≥ kn and Θ ≤ K∗. In particular, if θn = K∗N for all n > 1, no negative
deviation θ1 < K
∗
N is profitable.
Consider now a positive deviation, i.e., θN > K
∗
N ≥ kN while θn = K
∗
N for all n < N .
We have:
∂ΠNRO
∂θN
(
K∗
N
, ...,
K∗
N
, θN
)
= h (Θ) + θNh
′
(Θ)− Θ− θ
N
Θ2
KΨ
(
K, p¯S
)
.
By construction, Θ = θN + N−1N K
∗ > K∗ and θN − ΘN = N−1N
(
θN − K∗N
)
> 0,
therefore
HRO (Θ) + θNH
′
RO (Θ) < HRO (Θ) +
Θ
N
H
′
RO (Θ) < HRO (K
∗) +
K∗
N
H
′
RO (K
∗) < 0
by condition (2), hence
∂ΠNRO
∂θN
(
K∗
N , ...,
K∗
N , θ
N
)
< 0 for all θN > K
∗
N . No positive deviation
is profitable.
θn = K
∗
N for all n is therefore an equilibrium.
We now prove θn = K
∗
N ≥ kn for all n is the unique symmetric equilibrium. Since
∂ΠnRO
∂θn (θ
n , θ−n) > 0, no equilibrium exists for θn such that θn ≥ kn and Θ ≤ K∗.
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Finally, consider the case θn = ΘN >
K∗
N for all n:
∂ΠnRO
∂θn
(
Θ
N
, ...,
Θ
N
)
= h (Θ) +
Θ
N
h
′
(Θ)− N − 1
N
K
Θ
KΨ
(
K, p¯S
)
< 0.
There exists no symmetric equilibrium with ΘN >
K∗
N .
C.3 Equilibrium investment
In the first stage, producers decide on capacity, taking into account the equilibrium of
the options market. Denote V n (kn ,k−n) producer n profit function:
V n (kn ,k−n) = ΠnRO
(
kn ,
K∗
N
,k−n,
K∗
N
)
= Πn (kn ,k−n, )+
K∗
N
r+
(
kn − K
N
)
Ψ
(
K, p¯S
)
.
Differentiation with respect to kn yields
∂V n
∂kn
=
∂Πn
∂kn
+
N − 1
N
Ψ
(
K, p¯S
)
+
(
kn − K
N
)
∂Ψ
∂K
. (13)
A necessary condition for a symmetric equilibrium kn = KN is:
∂V n
∂kn
(
K
N
, ...,
K
N
)
=
∂Πn
∂kn
(
K
N
, ...,
K
N
)
+
N − 1
N
Ψ
(
K, p¯S
)
∂V n
∂kn
(
K
N , ...,
K
N
)
is decreasing since ∂Π
n
∂kn
(
K
N , ...,
K
N
)
is decreasing and ∂Ψ∂K < 0.
∂V n
∂kn (0, ..., 0) =
∂Πn
∂kn (0, ..., 0) +
N−1
N Ψ
(
0, p¯S
)
> 0 since (i) ∂Π
n
∂kn (0, ..., 0) > 0 and (ii) Ψ
(
0, p¯S
)
> 0 by
construction. limK→+∞ ∂V
n
∂kn (K) = −r < 0. Hence, there exists a unique KCRO > 0 such
that
∂ΠnRO
∂kn
(
KCRO
N , ...,
KCRO
N
)
= 0. This is equation (5). We prove in the main text that
KC
(
p¯S
) ≤ KCRO < K∗.
We prove below that kn =
KCRO
N for all n is an equilibrium, distinguishing the two
cases tˆ (K, c,N) ≤ tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
)
and tˆ (K, c,N) > tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
)
.
C.3.1 Generation produces at capacity before the strike price is reached
Consider first a negative deviation: k1 <
KCRO
N while k
n =
KCRO
N for all n > 1. To-
tal installed capacity is K = k1 + N−1N K
C
RO < K
C
RO. Substituting expression (9) for
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∂Πn
∂kn
(
k1 ,
KCRO
N , ...,
KCRO
N
)
into equation (13)
∂V 1
∂k1
(
k1 ,
KCRO
N
, ...,
KCRO
N
)
=
ˆ tˆ(K,c,N)
t1
(
ρ
(
Qˆ (k1 , t)
)
+ k1ρq
(
Qˆ (k1 , t)
) ∂Qˆ
∂k1
− c
)
f (t) dt
+
ˆ tˆ0(K,p¯S)
tˆ(K,c,N)
(ρ (K) + k1ρq (K)− c) f (t) dt
+
ˆ +∞
tˆ0(K,p¯S)
( (
p¯S − c)+ N−1N (ρ (K, t)− p¯S)
+
(
k1 − KN
)
ρq (K, t)
)
f (t) dt− r.
Substituting in equation (5), observing that tˆ (K, c,N) < tˆ
(
KCRO, c,N
)
and tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
)
<
tˆ0
(
KCRO, p¯
S
)
since K < KCRO, and rearranging yields
∂V 1
∂k1
(
k1 ,
KCRO
N
, ...,
KCRO
N
)
=
ˆ tˆ(K,c,N)
t1
(
ρ
(
Qˆ
)
+ k1qρ
(
Qˆ
) ∂Qˆ
∂k1
− c
)
f (t) dt
+
ˆ tˆ(KCRO,c,N)
tˆ(K,c,N)
(
ρ (K) + k1qρ (K)− c
)
f (t) dt
+
ˆ tˆ0(K,p¯S)
tˆ(KCRO,c,N)
 ρ (K) + k1qρ (K)
−
(
ρ
(
KCRO
)
+
KCRO
N ρq
(
KCRO
))
 f (t) dt
+
ˆ tˆ0(KCRO,p¯S)
tˆ0(K,p¯S)

p¯S − ρ (KCRO, t)− KCRON ρq (KCRO)
+N−1N
 ρ (K, t)− p¯S
+ρq (K, t)
(
k1 − KCRON
) 
 f (t) dt
+
N − 1
N
ˆ +∞
tˆ0(KCRO,p¯S)
 ρ (K, t)− ρ (KCRO, t)
+ρq (K, t)
(
k1 − KCRON
)  f (t) dt.
Each term is positive:
1. ρ
(
Qˆ
)
+ k1qρ
(
Qˆ
)
∂Qˆ
∂k1 − c =
(
k1 − φN) ρq (Qˆ) ∂Qˆ∂k1 ≥ 0 for t ∈ [t1, tˆ (K, c,N)]
2. ρ
(
K, tˆ (K, c,N)
)
+ k1qρ
(
K, tˆ (K, c,N)
)
= c, and ρt (K) + k
1ρqt (K) ≥ 0, hence
ρ (K) + k1qρ (K)− c ≥ 0 for t ∈
[
tˆ (K, c,N) , tˆ
(
KCRO, c,N
)]
3. ρq (Q) + qρqq (Q) < 0, hence ρ (K) + k
1ρq (K) ≥ ρ (K) + K
C
RO
N ρq (K) ≥ ρ
(
KCRO
)
+
KCRO
N ρq
(
KCRO
)
for t ∈ [tˆ (KCRO, c,N) , tˆ0 (K, p¯S)]
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4. ρ
(
KCRO, t
) ≤ p¯S for t ≤ tˆ0 (KCRO, p¯S) and ρ (K, t) ≥ p¯S for t ≥ tˆ0 (K, p¯S), hence(
p¯S − ρ (KCRO, t)− KCRON ρq (KCRO)+ N − 1N (ρ (K, t) ≥ p¯S)
)
≥ 0
for t ∈ [tˆ0 (K, p¯S) , tˆ0 (KCRO, p¯S)]
5. K ≤ KCRO, yields ρ (K, t) ≥ ρ
(
KCRO, t
)
for all t
Thus,
∂Π1RO
∂k1
(
k1 ,
KCRO
N , ...,
KCRO
N
)
> 0: a negative deviation is not profitable.
Consider now a positive deviation, kN >
KCRO
N while k
n =
KCRO
N for all n < N .
K = kN + N−1N K
C
RO > K
C
RO.
∂2V N
(∂kN )2
(
KCRO
N
, ...,
KCRO
N
, kN
)
=
∂2ΠN
(∂kN )2
+ 2
N − 1
N
∂Ψ
∂K
+
(
kN − K
N
)
∂2Ψ
(∂K)2
=
∂2ΠN
(∂kN )2
+
N − 1
N
ˆ +∞
tˆ0(K,p¯S)
 2ρq (K, t)
+
(
kN − KCRON
)
ρqq (K, t)
 f (t) dt
−
(
kN − K
N
)
ρq
(
K, tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
))
f
(
tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
)) ∂tˆ0 (K, p¯S)
∂K
.
Substituting in ∂
2ΠN
(∂kN )2
from equation (10),
∂2V N
(∂kN )2
(
KCRO
N
, ...,
KCRO
N
, kN
)
=
ˆ tˆ0(K,p¯S)
tˆ(K,c,N)
[
2ρq
(
Kˆ, t
)
+ kNρqq
(
Kˆ, t
)]
f (t) dt
+
N − 1
N
ˆ +∞
tˆ0(K,p¯S)
[
2ρq (K, t) +
(
kN − K
C
RO
N
)
ρqq (K, t)
]
f (t) dt
+
K
N
ρq
(
K, tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
))
f
(
tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
)) ∂tˆ0 (K, p¯S)
∂K
< 0.
A positive deviation is not profitable. Therefore
(
KCRO
N , ...,
KCRO
N
)
constitutes an equilib-
rium. Furthermore,
∂2V n
∂ (kn)2
(
K
N
, ...,
K
N
)
=
ˆ tp¯S
tN
[
2ρq (K, t) +
K
N
ρqq (K, t)
]
f (t) dt+ 2
N − 1
N
ˆ +∞
tp¯
S
ρq (K, t) f (t) dt
+
K
N
ρq
(
K, tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
))
f
(
tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
)) ∂tˆ0 (K, p¯S)
∂K
< 0
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hence
(
KCRO
N , ...,
KCRO
N
)
is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
C.3.2 The strike price is reached before generation produces at capacity
Substituting expression (12) for ∂Π
n
∂kn
(
k1 , ..., kN
)
into equation (13) yields
∂V n
∂kn
=
ˆ +∞
t˜n
(
p¯S − c) f (t) dt+N − 1
N
ˆ +∞
tˆ0(K,p¯S)
(
ρ (K, t)− p¯S)+(kn − K
N
)
∂Ψ
∂K
(
K, p¯S
)−r.
Suppose k1 = ... = kN−1 = K
C
RO
N . Then,
∂2V N
∂ (kN )2
= − (p¯S − c) f (t˜N) ∂t˜N
∂K
+
N − 1
N
ˆ +∞
tˆ0(K,p¯S)
[
2ρq (K, t) +
(
kN − K
C
RO
N
)
ρqq (K, t)
]
f (t) dt
−N − 1
N
(
kN − K
C
RO
N
)
ρq
(
K, tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
))
f
(
tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
)) ∂tˆ0 (K, p¯S)
∂K
.
Thus, if kN <
KCRO
N ,
∂2V N
∂(kN )2
< 0: a negative deviation is not profitable.
Consider now a positive deviation, kN >
KCRO
N . Since producer N is the last producer
to be constrained, t˜N = tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
)
. Substituting equation (12) into equation (13) yields
∂V n
∂kn
(
KCRO
N
, ...,
KCRO
N
, kN
)
=
ˆ +∞
tˆ0(K,p¯S)
(p¯S − c)+ N − 1
N
 (ρ (K, t)− p¯S)
+
(
kN − KCRON
)
ρq (K, t)
 f (t) dt
−
ˆ +∞
tˆ0(KCRO,p¯S)
[(
p¯S − c)+ N − 1
N
(
ρ
(
KCRO, t
)− p¯S)] f (t) dt
= −
ˆ tˆ0(K,p¯S)
tˆ0(KCRO,p¯S)
(
p¯S − c) f (t) dt
+
N − 1
N

´ +∞
tˆ0(K,p¯S)
(
ρ (K, t)− ρ (KCRO, t)) f (t) dt
− ´ tˆ0(K,p¯S)
tˆ0(KCRO,p¯S)
(
ρ
(
KCRO, t
)− p¯S) f (t) dt
+
(
kN − KCRON
) ´ +∞
tˆ0(K,p¯S)
ρq (K, t) f (t) dt
 .
Since K > KCRO, then tˆ0
(
K, p¯S
)
> tˆ0
(
KCRO, p¯
S
)
and ρ (K, t) < ρ
(
KCRO, t
)
, hence
the first three terms are negative. The last term is negative since kN >
KCRO
N and
ρq < 0. Thus,
∂V n
∂kn
(
KCRO
N , ...,
KCRO
N , k
N
)
< 0: a positive deviation is not profitable.
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(
KCRO
N , ...,
KCRO
N
)
is therefore an equilibrium. Furthermore,
∂2V n
∂ (kn)2
(
K
N
, ...,
K
N
)
= − (p¯S − c) f (tˆ0) ∂tˆ0
∂K
+ 2
N − 1
N
ˆ +∞
tˆ0(K,p¯S)
ρq (K, t) f (t) dt < 0
hence
(
KCRO
N , ...,
KCRO
N
)
is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
D Energy cum operating reserves market
Define the total surplus
S˚ (p, γ, t) = αS (p (t) , t) + (1− α)S (p, γ, t)
and total demand
D˚ (p, γ, t) = αS (p (t) , t) + (1− α)D (p, γ, t) .
The social planner’s program is:
max
{p(t),γ(t)},K
E
{
S˚ (p (t) , γ (t) , t)− cD˚ (p (t) , γ (t) , t)
}
− rK
st : (1 + h (t)) D˚ (p (t) , γ (t) , t) ≤ K (λ (t))
The associated Lagrangian is:
L = E
{
S˚ (p (t) , γ (t) , t)− cD˚ (p (t) , γ (t) , t) + λ (t)
[
K − (1 + h (t)) D˚ (p (t) , γ (t) , t)
]}
−rK
and: 
∂L
∂p(t) = {p (t)− [c+ (1 + h (t))λ (t)]} ∂D˚∂p(t)
∂L
∂γ(t) =
{
vt
[
D˚ (p (t) , γ (t)) , γ (t)
]
− [c+ (1 + h (t))λ (t)]
}
∂D˚
∂γ(t)
∂L
∂K = E [λ (t)]− r
First, off-peak λ (t) = 0 and γ (t) = 1. Then p (t) = c = w (t). This holds as long as
ρ
(
Q
1+h(t) , t
)
= c for Q ≤ K ⇔ t ≤ tˆOR0 (K, c).
Second, on-peak, if constant price customers are not curtailed, (1 + h (t)) D˚ (p (t) , 1, t) =
K hence λ (t) > 0 and γ (t) = 1. Then p (t) = c + λ (t) (1 + h (t)) = ρ
(
K
1+h(t) , t
)
and
λ (t) = w (t)− c = p(t)−c1+h(t) > 0.
Finally, constant price customers may have to be curtailed, (1 + h (t)) D˚ (p (t) , γ∗ (t) , t) =
K for γ∗ (t) < 1 such that (1 + h (t)) D˚ (v¯, γ∗ (t) , t) = K. Then (1 + h (t))λ (t) =
40
ρ
(
K
1+h(t) , t
)
− c as before.
The optimal capacity K∗OR is then defined by E [λ (t)] = r which yields equation (7).
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